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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 971259-CA

BRUCE N. MOORE,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for failure to respond to
an officer's signal to stop, interference with an arresting
officer, and assault on a police officer.

This Court has

jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (f) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did defendant's probation officer have reasonable

suspicion to stop defendant as he was driving along a road, where
for four consecutive months defendant had failed to report to the
probation officer and where defendant had not responded to any of
the officer's previous attempts to reach him by phone or mail?
An appellate court reviews a reasonable suspicion
determination under a correction of error standard with "a

1

measure of discretion to the trial judge."

State v. Pena, 869

P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994).
2.

Did the evidence support defendant's conviction for

resisting arrest, where the evidence demonstrated that, even
after defendant admittedly knew peace officers were present, he
continued to violently kick and struggle, and to verbally abuse
and threaten the officers, and refused to get into the police
car?
"In reviewing a jury verdict to determine if it was based on
sufficient evidence, [an appellate court] view[s] the evidence
presented and all inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the verdict.

Where there is any

evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
it, from which the findings of all the elements of the crime can
be made beyond a reasonable doubt, [the] inquiry is complete and
[the Court] will sustain the verdict."

State v. Gardner, 789

P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted), cert, denied 110
S.Ct. 1837 (1990).
3.

Has defendant preserved a claim of self defense where he

failed to raise such an argument before the trial court and has
asserted neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances on
appeal?
Where an issue has been waived, no standard of review
applies.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5, governing failure to respond
an officer's signal to stop, provides in pertinent part:
(1) An operator who, having received a
visual or audible signal from a peace officer
to bring his vehicle to a stop . . . attempts
to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle
or other means is guilty of a felony of the
third degree.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4, governing assault against a
peace officer, provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who assaults a peace
officer, with knowledge that he is a peace
officer, and when the peace officer is acting
within the scope of his authority as a peace
officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305, governing interference with a
arresting officer, provides:
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor
if he has knowledge, or by the exercise of
reasonable care should have knowledge, that a
peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful
arrest or detention of that person or another
and interferes with the arrest or detention
by:
(1) use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to
perform any act required by lawful order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or
detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved
in the arrest or detention; or
(3) the arrested person's . . . refusal
to refrain from performing any act that would
impede the arrest or detention.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one third degree felony for
failing to respond to an officer's signal to stop, one class B
misdemeanor for resisting arrest, and two class A misdemeanors
for assaulting a police officer (R. 19-21).

After a trial by

jury, defendant was convicted of all the charges except one of
the class A misdemeanors.

The court sentenced him to zero to

five years in the Utah State Prison on the felony charge, and one
year and six months in jail on the misdemeanors, all sentences to
run concurrently (R. 364-66).
totaling $2250 (Id.).

The court also levied fines

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal

(R. 367-68).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
In late May of 1995, Department of Corrections probation and
parole officer Brad Draper became defendant's probation
supervisor (R. 499, 503). On June 8th, both defendant and Draper
appeared in court at an order to show cause hearing arising from
probation violations committed by defendant (R. 502-03, 777).

In

response to these violations, the court extended defendant's
probation for an additional twelve months (R. 502).
As a term of his original probation, defendant was required
to report to the Department of Corrections by the 5th of each

1

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 233-34 (Utah
1992).
4

month (R.

499). Following the June 8th hearing, however,

defendant failed to report at all (R. 498-99, 484-86).

Officer

Draper tried on multiple occasions to contact defendant by letter
and by telephone, but to no avail (R. 498-99, 484-89).
On October 17, 1995, after having had no contact with
defendant since his appearance in court on June 8th, Officer
Draper recognized defendant driving in his truck in Roosevelt.
Draper maneuvered his vehicle behind defendant's and activated
his red and blue visor lights, which emitted a continuous series
of quick, high intensity flashes (R. 483-84).

When defendant

pulled over to the shoulder of the road, Draper approached him to
find out why he had not been reporting on a monthly basis, or why
he had not responded to Draper's multiple calls and letters (R.
483).

Draper wanted to know "if [defendant] had a

misunderstanding [or] if he just wasn't going to comply" (Id.).
To that end, Draper questioned defendant about his
probation.

Defendant responded, "I quit and nobody can force me

to go" (R. 482, 753). Draper gave defendant a direct order not
to leave and opened the driver's side door of defendant's truck
(R. 481, 752). Defendant responded by slamming the door and
stating, "I have a meeting to go to." He then sped off (R. 481,
752) .
Draper returned to his vehicle, visor lights still flashing,
and followed defendant, reporting back to dispatch that a chase

5

was in progress and requesting back-up (R. 480). Defendant drove
to the Division of Family Services building, pulled cock-eyed
into a parking stall, got out of his car, locked it, and headed
for the building (R. 478-79).

Draper pulled in behind him,

blocking his exit, and confronted defendant because he "didn't
want this situation going inside the building" (R. 478) . When
Draper approached him, defendant stated, "Get out of my way,
Draper, or I will fuck you up" (R. 477). Draper then put his
hand up and told defendant twice that he was under arrest and to
"cuff up" (R. 444, 478). As soon as Draper made physical contact
with defendant to handcuff him, defendant grabbed Draper around
the head (Id.).

Draper attempted to execute a "hair pull take

down," but was unable to do so (R. 476-77).
Officer Draper, at 185 pounds, was significantly smaller
than defendant (R. 741).2

Consequently, while Draper was able to

break free of defendant's grip several times, defendant succeeded
in reestablishing a headlock each time (R. 438, 455-56, 476).
Defendant was yelling obscenities and, despite Draper's continued
announcements that he was under arrest, defendant continued to
hold Draper and to refuse to "verbally settle down" (R. 476).
All Draper could do was try to limit defendant's movements (Id.).

2

Defendant weighed 280 pounds and was described by
witnesses as "a big guy" or "a pretty strong guy" (R. 438, 455,
477, 741). He had been a high school wrestling champion and,
despite some long-term physical disabilities, still retained good
upper body strength (R. 763-64).
6

At this juncture, two uniformed back-up officers arrived on
the scene (R. 437, 438, 457, 466, 471, 476). One of them, the
Roosevelt City police chief, described "an aggressive kind of
situation.

The defendant. . . was saying foul, abusive things,

threatening.

He was very aggressive at the time. . . Very

agitated" (R. 456). The other back-up officer recalled that
"Agent Draper [said], *You are under arrest.
arrest.'

You are under

The defendant . . . was screaming some profanities,

refusing to be, to submit to the arrest.

And it was a pretty

violent struggle going on there by the truck when I got there"
(R. 438).
Given defendant's size and strength, in order to regain
control, the back-up officers brought him to the ground (R. 438,
455, 471). On his stomach, defendant tucked his hands tightly
against his chest (R. 437, 470). Eventually, the officers forced
his arms out and handcuffed him (Id.).
struggle.

Defendant continued to

One of the back-up officers testified, "He was

screaming violently, screaming, making threats he was going to
kill everybody" (R. 437). Finally, after he kicked one of the
officers in the chest, he was put in leg restraints (R. 437, 454,
469) .
Restrained by both handcuffs and shackles, defendant
nonetheless refused to cooperate with the police.

As Draper

observed, "Every movement we would make, he would do something

7

against it" (R. 468). Rejecting the officers' request to get up,
defendant went rigid on the ground, refusing even to sit up (R.
435).

The officers ultimately stood defendant up, "just like a

post," and carried him over to the police car (Id.).

When the

officers asked defendant to get into the back seat of the
vehicle, he replied, "F-U.

I am not going to do it" (R. 435).

The three officers then loaded defendant into the car by sliding
his rigid body, stomach down, onto the back seat.

Because

defendant was taller than the car was wide, his feet stuck out of
the vehicle.

When the officers tried to lift his legs to get the

door closed, "[h]e would scream and yell "F-U" and straighten his
body out again" (R. 434). For both officer safety and to prevent
injury to defendant, one of the officers then used a stun gun to
administer an electronic shock behind defendant's knees in order
to get him to bring his legs into the car (R. 434, 453, 467).
The doors were then closed, and defendant was "sent . . . on his
way" to the police station (R. 433-34).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues first that he was not legally on probation
and that, consequently, the probation officer did not have
probable cause to stop him.

This argument fails not only on the

basis of waiver, but also on the merits.

No record evidence

suggests that defendant was not on probation.

And, in any event,

the proper standard for this stop and detention is reasonable

8

suspicion, not probable cause.

The facts in this case amply

support the officer's reasonable suspicion that defendant was in
violation of the terms of his probation agreement, thus
justifying both the initial stop and subsequent detention.
Defendant also argues that, in order to convict him of
resisting arrest, the State must establish both that defendant
had knowledge of the arresting party's status as a peace officer
and that the arrest was lawful.

In this case, defendant himself

testified that he had actual knowledge that Roosevelt City police
officers were present when he was on the ground, and that most of
the struggle occurred after that point.

Defendant's testimony

itself thus defeats his argument on appeal.

As to the lawfulness

of the arrest, even if it had been unlawful, it would not have
legally justified defendant's violent conduct towards the police.
Finally, defendant's argument that he was statutorily
justified in resisting arrest fails both because it is waived and
because the statutory justification defenses do not apply to
claims of resisting arrest.

9

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
DEFENDANT'S PROBATION OFFICER HAD
REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP HIM,
WHERE FOR FOUR MONTHS DEFENDANT HAD
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF
HIS PROBATION AGREEMENT AND WHERE
DEFENDANT HAD NOT RESPONDED TO ANY
OF HIS AGENT'S REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO
CONTACT HIM
The gist of defendant's argument seems to be that defendant
had no legal obligation to report to Officer Draper because
defendant was not subject to a valid probation agreement at the
time.

Furthermore, for the same reason, Draper lacked probable

cause to stop him (Br. of App. at 4-6).
Defendant's argument fails on a variety of grounds.

First,

defendant argued in the trial court that he had neither "agreed"
to any extension of his original probation nor signed any new
documents committing him to report (R. 759, 771).3

He did not

argue, as he does now, that the extension of his probation
agreement was statutorily unlawful.

Consequently, because

defendant is raising a new argument for the first time on appeal,

Without any record support, defendant claims that he
"explicitly objected to the terms of any extension at the June 8,
1995 hearing" (Br. of App. at 6). He has not, however, included
a transcript of that hearing as part of the record on appeal.
Consequently, his bare assertion will not suffice to preserve the
claim. See, e.g., State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah
1993) ("This Court simply cannot rule on a question which depends
for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record").
10

that argument is waived.

State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 294 n.l

(Utah App. 1990).
Furthermore, the position defendant now asserts is contrary
to the position asserted by defense counsel at trial.

Indeed, in

objecting to a line of questioning initiated by the State,
defense counsel stated, "It's a given fact in this case that Mr.
Moore is on probation.

I think . . . Officer Draper has

testified as to why he pulled him over because he was on
probation.

I don't think we need to go any further back into

that issue" (R. 776).4

By specifically acknowledging defendant's

status as a probationer, the defense has precluded the argument
that he was not on probation.

The law is well-settled that

"[t]he doctrine of invited error 'prohibits a party from setting
up an error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal.'"
State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991)(quoting
State v. Henderson, 792 P.2d 514, 516 (Wash. 1990)); accord State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)(noting that the rule
"discourages parties from intentionally misleading the trial
court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal").
Defendant's only remaining contention is the lawfulness of
Officer Draper's stop of defendant.

Once again, this issue was

not argued before the trial court and is, consequently, waived.

4

Although defense counsel was acting in an advisory
capacity, he participated actively and regularly during the
trial.
11

See, e.g., Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah
App. 1990) ("It is axiomatic in our adversary system that a party
must raise an objection in an earlier proceeding or waive its
right to litigate the issue in subsequent proceedings").
the merits, however, the argument fails.

Even on

Even if defendant had

not properly been on probation, the correct standard for
analyzing the propriety of the stop would be reasonable suspicion
and not, as defendant asserts, probable cause (Br. of App. at 67).

That is, a peace officer can lawfully stop any citizen on

the road when the officer can point to specific, articulable
facts which, together with rational inferences drawn from those
facts, would lead a reasonable person to believe that the
individual may be involved in criminal activity.

Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 21, 30 (1968); accord State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537,
541 (Utah App. 1990); Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995).
In this case, Officer Draper plainly had reasonable
suspicion to stop defendant.

Assigned as defendant's probation

officer, Draper knew that defendant had not reported in, as his
probation agreement required, for more than four months.

Nor had

Draper been successful in initiating contact with defendant
either by mail or telephone.

Under such circumstances, when

Draper saw defendant driving in Roosevelt City, he had ample
reason to believe that defendant was in violation of the terms of
his probation agreement.

See State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 529-
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30 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319, 1323 (Utah
App. 1996) . Consequently, he was justified in stopping him to
investigate the matter further.

Defendant's argument to the

contrary is, therefore, without merit.
POINT TWO
THE STATE ADDUCED SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION FOR RESISTING ARREST
WHERE THE EVIDENCE AMPLY
DEMONSTRATED THAT, EVEN AFTER
DEFENDANT ADMITTEDLY KNEW POLICE
OFFICERS WERE PRESENT, HE CONTINUED
TO VERBALLY ATTACK AND PHYSICALLY
STRUGGLE WITH THE POLICE OFFICERS
The gist of defendant's argument is that, in order to
convict him of resisting arrest, the State must establish both
that defendant had knowledge of the arresting party's status as a
peace officer and that the arrest was lawful (Br. of App. at 7).
In this case, defendant argues, the State only demonstrated that
he knew Officer Draper was a probation officer, not a peace
officer.

Furthermore, defendant asserts, the arrest itself "was

in fact unlawful" (Id. at 8). For these reasons, he believes the
State adduced insufficient evidence to convict him.
In reviewing a jury's verdict for sufficiency, an appellate
court's role is limited.

It does not sit as a "second fact

finder" nor does it determine the credibility of the witnesses.
State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994).

Indeed, an

appellate court will only reverse for insufficiency when the

13

evidence is so inconclusive that "reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt" that the defendant committed the
crime.

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983),

superseded by rule on other grounds. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d
191 (Utah 1987).
Defendant's argument fails both because he has improperly
interpreted the controlling statute and because he has
selectively applied the facts to the law as he interprets it.
The statute governing interference with an arresting officer
provides, in pertinent part, that a person is guilty if he "has
knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful
arrest or detention of that person."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305.

First, defendant assumes that the State must prove he had actual
knowledge, thus ignoring the important alternative phrase, "by
the exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge."

Id.

Under either alternative, however, the evidence was sufficient to
convict him.
As to actual

knowledge, defendant himself testified that,

after he was on the ground and handcuffed, he knew Roosevelt City
police officers were present (R. 761-62).

He further testified

that most of the struggle occurred after he was handcuffed, when
the officers tried to get him to stand up in order to transport
him in the police vehicle (R. 781).

14

Defendant's own testimony

thus established the element of knowledge that he now contests.
That is, apart from the initial confrontation with Officer
Draper, defendant's subsequent violent interactions with persons
he knew to be peace officers sufficed to establish that defendant
knew that peace officers were seeking to arrest him.5
As to knowledge defendant should

have had by the exercise of

reasonable care, the evidence was similarly sufficient.

Even

before the city police officers arrived, defendant should have
known that Draper was a peace officer.

Officer Draper was

defendant's probation agent, responsible for supervising
defendant and monitoring compliance with the terms of his
probation agreement (R. 504) .6 As a probation agent, Draper was
authorized to make arrests and "to conduct field stops to make
sure [probationers] are in compliance with their probation" (R.
475, 504). In his official capacity, Draper had met with
defendant in May of 1995 and had appeared with him in court the
next month at an order to show cause hearing arising from
probation violations (R. 499, 503). At the time of this
encounter, when Draper turned on his high intensity, blue and red

Defendant's actual knowledge also supports his conviction
for assault against a police officer, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-102.4.
6

Defendant has not included as part of the record on
appeal either the actual probation agreement or the trial court
order extending it. Consequently, any argument based on either
document is waived. Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 67.
15

flashing visor lights, he was in uniform, wearing a blue shirt
with a tie and brown pants, carrying a gun in a holster and a
badge on his belt (R. 473-74).
Moreover, if Draper's appearance and occupation were
insufficient to establish that defendant reasonably should have
known that he was being detained by a peace officer, the arrival
of the two back-up officers plainly settled the matter.

Both of

the officers, one of whom had been the Roosevelt City chief of
police for 17 years, were in uniform (R. 437, 448, 457). After
defendant had been handcuffed and shackled, the officers backed
off, thus giving defendant the opportunity to fully observe the
officers and reassess his conduct (R. 436, 469). Defendant,
however, subsequently refused to walk to the police car, refused
to get into the car, and continued to threaten the officers
verbally (R. 435). Such conduct, when defendant reasonably
should have known peace officers were arresting him, plainly
fulfilled the statutory requirements.
Second, defendant's contention that he is not culpable for
his actions because the arrest was unlawful is wholly
unpersuasive on the merits since even an unlawful arrest would
not have justified defendant's conduct.

This Court has plainly

rejected the proposition, now asserted by defendant, that "a
person may invoke the statutory justification defenses against a
charge of resisting arrest."

State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 616

16

(Utah 1997) (citing Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996); State v. Gardiner,
814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991)).

Indeed, Alonzo specifically ratified

Smooths holding that "the statutory justification defenses found
in sections 76-2-401 to 406 of the Utah Code do not apply to
claims of resisting arrest."
Smoot, 921 P.2d at 1010).

Alonzo, 932 P.2d at 617 (quoting

Consequently, defendant's argument

must fail, and the verdict must be sustained.
POINT THREE
BECAUSE DEFENDANT IS ARGUING FOR
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL THAT HE
WAS STATUTORILY JUSTIFIED IN
RESISTING ARREST AND HAS ASSERTED
NEITHER PLAIN ERROR NOR EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES AS A REASON FOR DOING
SO, HIS CLAIM IS WAIVED
Defendant asserts for the first time on appeal that he was
statutorily justified in using force against the officers in
order to defend himself (Br. of App. at 8-10).

This is an

entirely new argument, neither presented before nor ruled upon by
the trial court.

The law is well-settled that "[w]ith limited

exceptions, the practice of [appellate courts] has been to
decline consideration of issues raised for the first time on
appeal."

Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of E d u c , 797 P.2d 412,

413 (Utah 1990).

Absent exceptional circumstances or plain

error, neither of which defendant has asserted in this case,
defendant has waived consideration of a statutory self-defense
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justification on appeal.
(Utah 1987).

State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311

For this reason, this Court should decline to

consider defendant's claim.7
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
convictions for failure to respond to an officer's signal to
stop, a third degree felony; assault against a police officer, a
class A misdemeanor; and interference with an arresting officer,
a class B misdemeanor.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ]£_ day of July, 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

C. MJc__
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General

7

In any event, the claim has no merit. See Salt Lake City
v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963
(Utah 1996) (holding that the "'statutory justification defenses
found in sections 76-2-401 to 406 of the Utah Code do not apply
to claims of resisting arrest").
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